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Abstract 
What strategies households adopt to cope in an environment transformed by the development 
of a large-scale plantation or a contract farming scheme? and, especially, what role do women 
play to cope with the changes? This communication explores households’ strategies facing the 
development of these two business models, for a same crop, by a single enterprise in two 
distinct areas. In the large-scale plantation area, results show that households who lose land 
prefer opting for diversification rather than seizing the opportunities offered by the company. 
In this respect, women actively contribute to the households’ diversification strategy by 
running the livestock farming, doing handcraft, keeping the house and, punctually, selling 
their workforce in the neighborhood.  On the opposite, the households who suffer no land loss 
mostly take the jobs offered by the company - especially the women who can associate these 
daily jobs with their on farm and household activities. In the contract farming area, large 
farmers as well as small farmers get involved in the contractual scheme to diminish the 
production risks by diversifying their crops, to optimize their means of production or to 
overcome financial constraint. In this respect, women are often the ones who trigger the 
introduction of the contract in the household economy and, in one third of the cases; they are 
the ones signing the contract. The study, still in its qualitative stage (about 80 interviews, one 
month of intensive fields work in teamwork), identifies the key questions that will be explored 
and evaluated in the forthcoming quantitative study.  
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1 Introduction  
Despite the failure of Daewoo’s land lease contract and the 2009 coup in Madagascar, large-
scale land appropriations continue (Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al., 2011; Burnod et al., 
2013) and the promotion of agricultural investments is still on the political agenda. The new 
2014 - 2025 agricultural policy
1
 foresees the allocation of 2 million hectares for export-
oriented private investments and medium and large-scale plantations. Hence, debates on more 
inclusive business models remain scarce despite several experiences of contract farming 
developed for over 10 years in Madagascar (Minten et al., 2009). Impacts and lessons learnt 
from these two business models, large-scale plantation and contract farming, need to be 
analyzed and compared to deepen the policy dialogue and policy design process 
(Andrianirina-Ratsialonana and Teyssier, 2010; Burnod et al., 2011).  
To feed the policy dialogue, the respective impacts of large-scale farms and contract farming 
schemes need to be identified and evaluated on case studies basis. However the relevance of 
the impacts measures will be enhanced by a thorough understanding of the reaction and 
adaptation mechanisms of rural households in a socio economic environment transformed by 
an agri-business. The communication explores then two main issues: i) what strategies 
households do adopt in a socio-economic context transformed by the company and ii) what 
roles women do play in these strategies and adaptations. 
This paper investigates the households and women strategies in two contrasted business 
models involving a same enterprise and a same crop
2
. Both agricultural investments are 
located in similar agro-ecological areas in the Malagasy highlands with similar roads and 
markets accesses. 
The communication is based on results from the first phase of a study, funded by Union 
European
3
 and jointly conducted by the Malagasy Land Observatory, the French research 
institute on International Cooperation for Agronomy for Development (Cirad) and the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nation (FAO).This first phase uses a qualitative 
approach to analyze and impacts of the two business models on strategies and management of 
land, labor and capital at the household level
4
 (cf. Bres et al., forthcoming). Data have been 
generated through a field work of 30 days (August 2013) by a team of 7 persons (junior and 
senior experts and researcher) which were able to complete 80 interviews. Building on the 
results and being fully correlated to this first part, a second phase is planned for the end of 
2014 with a quantitative approach.  
From a brief overview of the company, this paper outlines successively the findings for the 
large-scale plantation area and the contract farming area. For each, it presents the changes 
triggered by the agribusiness at local level and the households’ strategies to overcome the new 
constraints or seize the new opportunities. Then, it focuses on the role of women in the 
establishment of the household coping strategies. At last, the conclusion draws on the ways 
within each business model to lessen the negative impact and enhance the positive ones, 
especially for women.   
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 More exactly, the Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries Sector Policy (PSAEP) 
2
 The authors have decided not to disclose the name of the enterprise and the type of crop. In the rest of the 
document, to ease the reading, the enterprise will be called “Madculture” and the crop “crop A”.   
3
 Under the programme Improved Global Governance for Hunger Reduction Programme implemented by FAO. 
4
 The effects of the business models on the territories (water access and governance, local development, etc.) are 
not included in this paper.  
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2 The company  
Madculture is a company with foreign capital, created in 2005 in Madagascar. In parallel of 
starting (and failing to implement) a first plantation, the company launches in 2006 a contract 
farming scheme with the “crop A”. In 2009, the company has already contracted with 2,000 
farmers for a total area of 700 ha. Then, continuing its geographical expansion in several 
regions of the country, in 2013, the company signed contract with 7,000 farmers for an area 
over 1,400 ha. It employs 90 staff for managing and monitoring the contract farming scheme 
and the 7000 farmers under contract represent an equivalent of 1,712 permanent employees. 
Thus, in a schematic way and to give a general idea, MadCulture generates an equivalent of 
1.3 full time jobs per hectare. It has yearly grown by 875 farmers and by 175 ha of crop A. 
Nevertheless, it has nearly invested USD 5,000
5
 per hectare to develop the contract farming 
scheme, including agronomic research, support to the production and the contract monitoring 
tools.  
In parallel, in 2010, the company decided to develop its own plantation and rented, from a 
private company Colim
6
, 650 ha of which only 500 hectares are cultivable. The company 
objectives were i) to rapidly increase the crop “A” production to fulfill buyers’ orders, ii) to 
ensure to its own process factory the supply of crop “A” and iii) to conduct agronomic trials 
to improve yield and quality. Madculture has cultivated 100 ha in 2011 and about 200 
hectares in 2013. It cannot proceed to any further crop extensions due to competing claims 
with the local communities on an area of 240 hectares. The company employs the equivalent 
of 202 permanent employees (cf. infra). Thus, to give once again a general idea, the company 
has developed 70 hectares per year and has created the equivalent of 1 permanent 
employment per hectare. However, recovering an agricultural estate badly maintained, the 
company has to invest USD 8,000 per hectare (USD 20,000 per cultivated hectare).  
3 The large-scale farming model 
3.1 Changes in local land access and governance  
Development of mega farms usually leads to legal changes in land management and above all, 
in land access. The targeted lands, legally recognized or not as a customary property, become 
state-owned land (Alden-Wily, 2011), in some cases with local authorities’ approval (German 
et al., 2013). The lands are then allocated to investors. In Madagascar, since the 2005 reform, 
new land laws recognize local land rights and enable the decentralization of land management 
at the Commune level. They protect the appropriated and occupied lands under new the legal 
status of ‘untitled private property’ (Propriétés Privées Non Titrées7 - PPNT). Consequently, 
these laws require the State and its services to only lease or sell to investors land that is 
actually unoccupied or registered in the name of the state.  
However, these laws are ignored – sometimes deliberately – by the administration and/or 
local decision-makers
8
. Hence appropriated lands (PPNT) are still at risk of being seized by 
the State and allocated to investors (Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al., 2011; Burnod et al., 
2013).  
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 Data from Madculture.  
6
 Name has also been transformed.  
7
 In French. 
8
 They want to see the project develop, to get some rents for their territory (communes, Regions, etc.) and, 
sometimes, to extract some unofficial rents 
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The situation is different in the present case-study. The agricultural estate was titled several 
decades ago. Successively it has been the property of French colonists, Malagasy State and, 
for the past three decades, of the private company Colim. Then, its legal status has not 
changed with MadCulture as this latter is only the legal tenant. This legal situation should 
then confer to the company land tenure security.   
If there is no legal change, there are, on the other hand, strong changes in the land access and 
governance. In the studied case, the lands have never been fully cultivated neither by the 
successive owners of the estate (colonists, State and Colim) nor by its successive tenants – as 
the latter used mainly the buildings for livestock production (chicken)
9
. Therefore, the lands 
have been progressively exploited by farmers from surrounding villages. Moreover, access to 
these lands has been under the informal control of some villagers, the former foremen of the 
colonial estate and their descendants, all coming from the village called Volana
10
. 
MadCulture’s setting up has completely overwhelmed this situation: the farmers - considered 
as squatters by the law, can no more access to land and the few families that control land 
access see its power dwindles.  
The inventory of the number of farmers and cultivated areas before MadCulture’s setting up is 
highly controversial. On the basis of a census conducted by local people, a civil society 
organization announced that 400 families over an area of 200 ha in 5 villages were affected
11
. 
On the basis of a census driven by experts paid by the company – which is supposed to be 
validated by local authorities, the company acknowledged 270 individuals as affected over an 
area of 240 ha in 7 main villages. According to this latter census, an half of affected farmers 
(about 150) and two thirds of the affected area (about 150 ha) are located in a unique village, 
Volana.  
MadCulture manages to cultivate 200 ha but is faced with conflicts over the 240 ha of former 
occupied lands. The company has tried several times to engage negotiations. In particular, it 
offered the farmers the opportunity to formalize their rights on the occupied plot or to enjoy 
use rights on new plots through annual land leases. But the villagers from Volona, strongly 
involved against Colim and Madculture, opposed this proposal. In addition, they have 
organized several protests, supported by the civil society organizations and politicians seeking 
for a high media profile. One of these protests has even led to temporary detentions. Farmers 
are actually still fighting both on the field, by occupying the land, and on the legal side, by 
requesting to the court to recognize their land occupation anteriority and to question the 
ownership of Colim
12
. At last, MadCulture attracts media spotlights and finds itself in a 
counterproductive position. It risks being point out by media if it cultivates farmer’s occupied 
lands and loosing profits if it does not cultivate them. In addition, the legal owner delays 
reacting to the situation and some farmers refuse to return to the bargaining table.  
As a result, the large-scale farming model, developed to boost the production of crop A, does 
not reach its goals. It even proves to be slower than the contract farming model, the annual 
increase in crop A area being 70 ha for the former, 175 ha for the latter. Large-scale land 
access – in a situation that one can have considered as secured thanks to its legal validation – 
remains complicated and source of conflicts. When land access land is legally granted but not 
                                                 
9
 A single few hectares length area of the concession contains houses for workers and managers, storage 
buildings, poultries, greenhouses... 
10
 This name has also been transformed 
11
 Another collective civil society organization announced in a hurry in the media that 6,000 families are affected 
over 200 ha. At first sight, this data seems to be too important regarding average surface area of small-scale 
farms and the number of inhabitants in the area.  
12
 The way Colim became landowner is opaque and can be contested according to the farmers.  
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recognized as legitimate at local level, there is a high risk of conflicts (Lavigne Delville et al., 
1998).  
3.2 Changes in the local labor markets  
Some rural policies promote the development of large-scale farming to develop the rural labor 
market (cf. Deininger et al., 2011). New employees may be those who have lost their lands; 
the appropriation of large areas - such as all enclosure (Polanyi, 1975; Alden-Wily, 2012) 
obliging them to sell their workforce in the dynamics of « proletarianization » (Li 2011; 
Kenney-Lazar 2012). This new employees often belong to  the poorest households (including 
migrants) who own few land and are thus little affected by the land appropriation (Maertens 
and Swinnen, 2009; in Madagascar, Minten et al., 2009; Medernach and Burnod, 2013).  
In the studied zone, the successive companies have generated local employment although the 
total number of employees has been sharply varying depending on their activities (agriculture 
and/or livestock) and size. According to some interviewees
13
, Madculture would be the higher 
job provider but the one who supplies the lesser attractive working conditions. The company 
employs 40 permanent staffs and between 80 and 500 seasonal workers per day depending on 
seasons, which represents the equivalent of 162 full time staff
14
. It mainly recruits in the 7 
surroundings villages (in 2013, 70% of daily workers registered came from these villages). 
This new labor demand has not been an appeal for immigration; employees from the most 
remote villages commute with a maximum of 2 hours walk.  
The company’s labor needs are maximal in July and August (500 seasonal jobs per day) but 
they are easily satisfied, as neighboring farmers have little agricultural works during the dry 
season. Labor needs are limited from November to January (80 to 100 seasonal jobs per day) 
but the company struggles to recruit. At his time of the year, the households have a labor 
peak. They prefer working on their plots (soil preparation and rice transplanting) to ensure 
their food consumption or on their neighbors’ plots to maintain solidarity networks (or to get 
better working conditions) than being employed by the company. For three years, the 
company tries to spread in time the planting of A in order to level its labor needs throughout 
the year. 
The daily pay is 3,000 MGA
15
 (7 hours) or 4,000 MGA per task (one task can be normally 
handled in 4 to 6 hours). The rates are similar to the ones of the local labor market but the 
company does not provide meals and pays only once a week.  
3.3 The losers and the winners 
Local communities are far from being homogeneous. They react differently (for or against the 
investments) depending on whether they benefit from or suffer from the company’s 
establishment (Borras and Franco, 2012).  
Depending on the villages and the households, changes in land access are contrasted. Volana 
village (about 150 individuals) has clearly lost more lands (150 ha) than other villages 
(between 11 and 28 ha for 4 villages and less than 5 ha for the last 2 villages). At household’s 
level, these losses may vary from zero to 2 hectares (between 0.5 ha and 0.9 ha on average
16
). 
In addition, they are more or less heavy depending on the part of farm area included in 
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 The statement has not been cross-checked. 
14
 Based on annual labor cost declared by the company.  
15
 USD 1 = about 2,300 MGA. 
16 On the basis of respective data declared by civil society and the company  
6 
 
Colim’s estate17 and on the quality of the plots (rice fields or hill lands). Thus, some 
household has endured no change while others have no more land to cultivate.  Due to the 
high land pressure in the studied zone, no family farm has been able to buy, lease or borrow 
new plots. At last, these losses are not all effective. Some farmers have their plots included in 
Colim’s estate but these latter have not been yet claimed or used by MadCulture. Thus, they 
continue cultivating on them but feel insecure. Other farmers have recovered their plots to 
militantly cultivate them and to prevent the company using them.  
Again, depending on villages and households, changes in labor market access are contrasted. 
In the 7 surrounding villages, 902 individuals are registered as daily workers in the company’s 
record (as there are about 1 100 households in total in these villages, on average, 8 households 
out of 10 have a member of their families interested in selling their labor force) and 85% of 
them come from the 3 nearest villages. However, villagers from Volana are badly represented 
in the company’s record (only 25% of the registered day laborers) due to their reluctance to 
work for the company. At household’s level, seeking employment with the company depends 
on their strategies and positioning with Madculture.  
a. Strategy 1: Agriculture and employment with MadCulture 
The households, who take the company’s jobs, are not the ones who lost land, but on the 
contrary, the ones who suffer no land losses. They voluntarily look for job and they are not 
forced to it due to a lesser access to land. .  
The small farmers (running a farm of less than 10 Ares) get the salaried work as they used 
to by past with the former companies. They can recover their previous standards of living 
although MadCulture – according to some - does not offer neither better working conditions 
nor wages.  
Unlike other foreign or Malagasy situations (Maertens and Swinnen, 2009; Medernach and 
Burnod, 2013), the most precarious households are not the only one to benefit from the new 
labor offer. Medium and large farmers (cultivating respectively between 10 and 80 Ares 
and more than 80 Ares) apply for job on a daily basis. They strengthen the diversification 
of their activities (agriculture, masonry, and handcraft) without challenging nor the priority 
given to agricultural works neither the intra-familial labor organization. One or more 
household members (one spouse, and/or youth) can work alternately for the company. 
b. Strategy 2: Agriculture and employment strategy out of MadCulture 
Small and medium farmers, that have lost 40 to 100% of their lands, reacted to the 
shock not by developing a new activity but by increasing pre-existing non-farm activities 
(masonry, off farm job). The sale of labor force is an option but not the only one. Besides, 
even if sometimes wages are more profitable than agricultural productions, agricultural 
production still has priority. Moreover, for reasons of pride and opposition to the company, 
household members would work with other employers rather than with MadCulture – even if 
they occasionally work for the company. Land losses cause then the reinforcement of 
household diversification but not only a simple proletarization.  
c. Strategy 3: Agriculture and livestock farming strategy 
Medium and large family farmers, who have lost between 65 to 100% of their lands, 
have also chosen to reinforce their diversification. They rely on salaried work and livestock 
farming. They do not develop new breeding activities but reinforce existing ones depending 
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 Losses range from 0 to 100% of households’ lands  
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on their level of capitalization with, in ascending order, pig fattening, reproduction and pig 
fattening, cattle fattening, cow’s milk production and chicken or egg-producing intensive 
farming. These types of livestock have the advantage of requiring few land areas. Cattle 
breeders have to change their practices due to the lesser access to pasture areas and rice straw 
production, and the bigger working time for grass collecting
18
. Some (cattle or pigs) breeders 
are sometimes in a process of decapitalization. They have reported weight losses and animals’ 
losses. Unable or unlucky to find jobs, they cannot afford buying rice, they used to produce 
before, and livestock feed. Finally, some breeders left some cows to relatives living outside 
the studied zone.  
d. No strategy: A waiting position  
These farmers are not, for the time being, committed to any strategy to overcome land losses. 
They are in a progressive process of livestock decapitalization. Some of them are old farmers 
that do not have enough means or energy to develop new activities; their hope is that, as the 
precedent tenants did, Madculture will stop and leave the zone and that they can recover their 
lands.  
e. Diversification as a key strategy 
The households who endured not land losses benefit the most from MadCulture’s jobs. They 
are in a « winning » situation: they can reinforce their diversification without reduction the 
importance of agriculture.  
The households who have lost lands also opt to reinforce diversification – without being 
trapped in a process of forced proletarianization (eg Li, 2011; Kenney Lazar, 2012). It is even 
easier as the study zone is close to an urban center and well connected with markets. It is also 
easier and more profitable for the richest and most experienced farmers.   
Effects on income and food security will be systematically assessed during the quantitative 
study. All households, that produce less rice, are constrained to buy rice over a longer period. 
They consider that their situation has deteriorated even if some farmers, thanks to off-farm 
jobs, can earn slightly more than before.  
Households in conflict with MadCulture are those who do not benefit from any advantage 
offered by company. They have lost their access to lands, they do not take the company’s jobs 
and some of them have also lost control on land access. Fighting against the company is a 
way to recover their means of production and to keep their identity.  
3.4 Women’s role in these changes    
Women play a key role in these strategies and changes. Diversification strategies result from 
household members’ joint actions: the husband or the sons manage agriculture works or seek 
for jobs outside the village
19
 while the wife does the household tasks, practices handcraft, 
reinforces livestock breeding activities and, with her children, contributes to agricultural 
activities. Women should cope with activities allowing them to stay close to home and 
adaptable in terms of organization. They can also sell their labor force – mainly as daily 
workers – with neighboring farmers or the company.  
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 Before the company’s setting up, a breeder estimates that he could cut alone about ten bags of grass per day, 
now he declares to collect the same quantity over the same time with his 4 children’s help. 
19
 In some cases, the husband is constrained to leave the village almost the entire year to look for jobs (mainly in 
construction industry), the wife manages the household as well as income from these off-farm activities. 
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Besides, women are the one who seized most the opportunities offered by the company. If 
they represent 52% of the daily workers in the company’s register in 2013, they are more 
frequently recruited than men because they are preferentially selected for specific agricultural 
tasks such as planting, weeding, watering.  
4 Contract farming 
4.1 Contractual terms 
The contract stipulates that the company supplies inputs (seeds and chemicals), provides 
technical support (thanks to a “bridging farmer” 20) and buys the production at a price fixed 
before planting time and completed by a quality premium. The company pays the farmers 
only after the collect of the production and the control of the quality. The contract mentions 
on the other hand that the farmer has to cultivate 1 are at the very least
21
, follow the technical 
requirement, water the crop
22
 and to supply and use organic manure when seedling. 
4.2 Motives to contract 
a. Crop diversification and reduction of pests and disease control 
Shared by all households, diversification is the first motive to cultivate the crop A. Farmers do 
not intent specialization while adopting crop A. Crop A does not compete with the food crops 
(on this issue, see Glover, 1984; Baumann, 2000; Singh, 2002). Farmers perceive the crop A 
as complementary and not as a priority and cultivate it only if they have extra family labor 
and available appropriate land (irrigated or close to a water font). As they cultivate it during 
the dry season, the lower demanding agricultural labor period, they rely only on family 
workforce in the majority of cases. They have to recruit laborers only if the harvest comes late 
and overlaps with the rice transplanting.  
A second motive to cultivate the crop A, once again shared by all household, is linked to pest 
and disease control. Crop A is very resistant to attacks in comparison with the other dry 
season crops. In the studied area, farmers, which have been cultivating the same crop for 
years, face decreasing yields due to the increase pest and diseases. They seize the opportunity 
offered by the crop A to avoid the growing economical adversity. From beans production in 
the 90’s decade, low yields made them shift to cabbage production. After another decade of 
decreasing yields, crop A has been welcomed. As a consequence of the introduction of the 
crop A in the rotation, the pest and disease pressure also diminish for the other crops (cabbage 
and beans).  
The other motives to contract with the company to cultivate A are then varying for each 
household.  
b. Optimization of means of production  
Large and medium farmers (with, respectively, rice plots between 30 and 100 Ares, and 
higher than 1 ha) cultivate the crop A to optimize their means of production. As they have few 
agricultural tasks during the dry season, they can better use their land and family labor by 
cultivating A. Thus, in the studied case and unlike other contexts (e.g. Little, 1994; Glover 
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A farmer, living in the neighborhood and already experienced, visit and advice the other producers once a 
month.   
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 But this rule is not strictly enforced.   
22
 Like other crop cultivated during the dry season, the crop A needs water every two or three days.  
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and Kusterer, 1990; Reardon et al., 2009), contract farming does not increase the demand on 
the local labor market but generates a better valorization of family labor.  
Nevertheless, other large and medium farmers who want to optimize their means of 
production can choose more profitable crops: rice or another crop under contract (crop B) 
promoted by another company. Their choice is possible only if they have a good water access; 
rice and crop B requiring more water than crop A.  
Some smallholders (farming rice on less than 30 Ares) want also to optimize their mean of 
productions but they can achieve it only if they have access to an extra plot closed to a water 
point
23
. Lots of them obtain this access thanks to land lend for free allowed for a 5 months 
period (the dry season)
 24
. Unlike others contexts (Colin and Ayouz, 2006; Burnod and Colin, 
2012; Ruf, 2013), the expansion of the crop, stimulated by the contractual scheme, does not 
contribute to the emergence or to the dynamics of land markets (sales and lease markets). On 
the contrary, the expansion of the crop relies on transactions realized outside the markets and 
rooted in solidarity and proximity networks.   
c. Overcoming capital constraint and cash problem  
Smallholders and medium farmers contract with the company for two major reasons: the 
funding of the inputs by the company and the payment of the production in one single time.   
Some poorer farmers can indeed cultivate during the dry season thanks to this contract that 
supplies the plant and this crop that does not need lots of chemicals – unlike beans or 
cabbage. However they have to size the area cultivated to the manure they have. Other 
smallholders do not contract with the company because they cannot wait for the payment, 
done more than 7 months after the planting. As they are facing lower cash availability, they 
prefer cultivating small areas with crops that can be harvested and sold more quickly and 
regularly than the crop A (such as local vegetable with leaf like spinach).  
Some smallholders also really enjoy the payment in once. Thanks to this amount of money, 
more or less limited according to the area cultivated, they can invest it in livestock (poultry, 
pigs or cows). Then they sell them according to their needs in order to cover school fees, the 
labor for the rice transplanting, land certificate or bigger investment (house building). 
Besides, some of the poorest households state that they ask less frequently for credit to local 
land borrower since they cultivate the crop A.  
4.1 Women participation in the contractual scheme  
A recurrent question in respect to contractual farming relate to its effects in terms of exclusion 
or inclusion of the smaller family farms (Key and Runsten, 1999; Baumann, 2000; Dolan and 
Humphrey, 2000; Singh, 2002; Simmons, 2002). In the studied area, the bigger farms
25
 were 
the first to contract with the company and adopt the crop. These farms, with lesser financial 
constraints than the others, were able to overtake innovation risk and were generally used to 
seize the opportunities offered by companies or development project. But the medium and the 
small got also progressively involved. In the studied area, the crop area under contract has 
increased until 2012 and reached 50 hectares and 346 farmers. Farmers who contract with the 
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 The distance between the water point and the plot has a strong impact on the labor investment. When the water 
point is close, the watering of 10 Ares require 35 working days in average during 4 months. When the water 
point is distant, the watering of the same area can require twice or three times this amount of labor.  
24
 Some smallholders temporarily stop cultivating A for lack of access to land in time.   
25
 Large farms’ land area: > 1 ha; medium farms’ land area: between 30 Ares and 1 ha; small farms’ land area: < 
30 Ares. 
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firms have very different profile: they are from 18 to 60 years old and cultivate the crop A on 
areas comprised between 2.5 to 55 Ares. This underlines that the contractual scheme is 
relatively inclusive.   
More specifically, women are well represented among the one who contract with the 
company. In 2012, they signed about one third of the all contract (company’s data). 
Moreover, they often are the cause of the contracts signed by men. And, whatever the identity 
of the contracting, they are strongly involved in the contracts implementation.  
In other contexts (Guyer and Peters, 1987; Watts, 1994), the fact that only one member of the 
household signs the contract – generally the men due to his statute of household head – can be 
a source of conflict. The work overload induced by the crop under contract can be contested 
by the household members, these latter seeing their duties increase without enjoying 
additional rights or advantages. Also, the development of the crop under contract can weaken 
land access for the household members. The household chief can impose the crop on land 
cultivated and managed by his wife (wives) and children (op. cit.; Eaton and Shepherd, 2001). 
In the studied case, men do not impose the crop A on women. On the contrary, women are 
often the ones who take the initiative in establishing the contractual relation even if they let 
their husband sign the contract.  
Women generally want to cultivate the crop to get a payment in once to invest this money for 
specific expenditure such as buying livestock or covering school fees. Actively involved in 
the daily exchange in solidarity and proximity networks, they often ask neighbors for a land 
lend for free. Then they do most of the agricultural tasks to cultivate crop A, except the 
plowing, generally done by men. They do, often with the youngest children during holidays 
break, the weeding and above all, the daily watering. They also realize most of the post-
harvest tasks (drying).    
As a matter of fact their implication in the production (from investing labor force to asking for 
a lending) and in the management of the household budget strongly contribute to trigger the 
contractual relation.  
Farmers’ organizations can reduce the transaction costs of dealing with a large number of 
farmers and, more generally, the cost of implementing the contractual scheme. Above all, 
farmers’ organizations can present a cohesive position, address asymmetries in bargaining 
power with investors and government and then, design more collaborative and equitable 
schemes (Little and Watts, 1994). They can also encounter collective action problems, lead to 
the exclusion of some smallholders or be opportunistically used by elite members (Baumann, 
2000; Burnod and Colin, 2012). In the studied area, no farmers’ organization deals with crop 
A company or contractual issues. Madculture refuse to deal with organizations in order to 
avoid their internal dissensions and maybe, their cohesive position and better bargaining 
power. It also refuses to deal with organization to implement better individual traceability 
system. Nevertheless some women association developed the crop A. Some women of the 
area have used this contract farming opportunity to gather in an association that uses the profit 
of the harvest to create a rice bank and sell it at low prices all year round for members. 
 
Conclusion  
MadCulture is involved in two business models: contractual farming and large-scale 
plantation. The contractual scheme has two major advantages: the production costs are lower 
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than the large plantation’s ones (according to MadCulture managers) and, above all, it triggers 
no land conflict. The large plantation model has indeed a major drawback: the difficulty to get 
a secure land access and, as MadCulture emphasized it, even in a situation where land access 
is entirely legal. Consequently, the expansion of the cultivated areas in crop A under the 
contractual scheme, was faster (175 ha per year versus 70 ha per year in average) and cheaper 
(5000 USD per ha versus 8000 USD per year) than the one of the large plantation. 
Local changes are more important under the large plantation model and result, unlike the 
contractual farming, in the creation of inequalities and “loser” groups. The local households 
have suffered different level of land loses up to a complete loss of access for some of them. 
Even so, these affected households do not mechanically become the company’s laborers. 
While they do not have enough means to develop new activities, they choose to strengthen the 
existing productions: breeding, hand crafting and off farm jobs. All household members 
contribute to this diversification but women particularly invest in the activities in-house or at 
village level: agriculture, chicken or pig breeding, hand craft and jobs in the neighborhood. 
Then agribusiness companies that develop large-scale plantations should have a detailed 
assessment of the local activity systems (including on and off farms). If these companies 
chose not to avoid expropriation they could support the affected households – within or 
outside a public-private partnership, via direct intervention or a financial contribution – in 
their diverse activities (agriculture, breeding) or by up and downstream interventions 
(supplying inputs, promoting market access, etc). These supports, by focusing on local 
activities and not especially on women, could de facto have a positive impact on women.    
Besides, households’ strategies to sell their labor force are not a reaction imposed by the land 
loss. The household who mostly seek company’s labor are the ones who did not suffer any 
land loss whether they are small or big farmers. Then, as often underlined in the literature, 
agribusiness should create well-paid jobs (at the legal rate or even more), finance health 
insurance and retirement contributions and supply training courses –  to help local people to 
apply to different kind of jobs inside the company and not only the basic ones. It is also often 
recommended that agribusiness should create permanent jobs. However, the MadCulture’s 
case underlines that daily jobs are more accessible to women than permanent ones. Men 
prefer looking for permanent jobs while women prefer selling their labor force on a daily 
basis to manage their off and on farm activities. Promoting women access to permanent jobs 
would imply a more systemic approach and changes in the management of domestic tasks and 
structures to look after the children (from school to kinder garden ?..).  
There are then two contrasted groups: the losers and the winners. The local tensions oppose 
the company to the ‘loser’ groups but they also oppose these ‘losers’ to the ‘winners’. Then 
agribusiness companies that develop large-scale plantations should have a detailed assessment 
of the land uses and rights and above all, should respect these rights. If they could not avoid 
any encroachment on appropriated land or on titled land, they should recognize those 
occupations through lending land for free or leasing it with low rents. In the studied case, 
women are not involved in the negotiation process or in the team leading the conflict as they 
are not involved in local politics in general. The agribusiness should try to include more the 
women in the negotiation process (by organizing if necessary common and separate 
consultations) to identify new options to solve the conflict.  
On the other hand, The MadCulture’s contractual scheme does not result in drastic changes in 
land access. Moreover, the business model is inclusive. A large panel of farmers, from the 
small to the big ones, develops this new crop. Women are particularly pro-active: they take 
the initiative in establishing the contractual relation or they sign the contract. Thanks to this 
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contract, they can develop a cash crop without financing the inputs. They can also perceive 
payment in cash and in once and reinvest it in breeding activities or school fees. In the studied 
zone, the success of this contractual scheme – involving numerous farmers including the 
smallest –relies on the large practice of land lend for free and the local solidarity that supports 
it.   
Several lessons can be learnt from the Madculture’s case. Agribusinesses can promote 
sustainable and inclusive contract schemes through:  
- recognizing and respecting local land rights (regardless of the formalisation of rights) and 
controlling, before signing the contract, that the land use change is not done to the detriment 
of women; 
- supporting smallholders, within or outside a public-private partnership, in relation to access 
to inputs (from seeds to credit) and, particularly, access to expertise and training so that a 
wide range of smallholders can conform to new standards of production, increase the yields 
and ameliorate the quality – quality and yield being profitable both to the company and to the 
farmers ;  
- implementing transparent management and effective communication on terms and 
conditions determining the purchase prices and the costs charged to the producers. In certain 
cases (cf Burnod and Colin, 2012), the quality of the relationship between agribusiness and 
smallholders proves to be more important than the method of formalising the relationship (i.e. 
type of written contract). Nevertheless, it is important to promote the fact that women can sign 
and manage the contract;  
The agricultural sector in Southern countries requires investments to provide diversified crop 
productions, create employment and ensure sustainable natural resources management. In 
Madagascar, neither agricultural policy nor land policies address frontally which types of 
business models have to be promoted (large-scale plantation, contract farming, joint venture, 
other). The default position is then to develop the coexistence of different forms of 
agricultural investments without articulating their complementary and, above all, limiting 
their competing dimensions. This research aims to generate and feed the debate on the rural 
policies and business models to promote and, consequently, on the incentives to implement 
(tax system, land access, etc) (Andriamanalina and Burnod, forthcoming). 
Donor agencies and/or foundations are keen to support financially the implementation of 
contract schemes.  Without these incentives, agribusiness companies would often remain 
reluctant to launch schemes with numerous smallholders due to the high transaction costs. A 
challenge is therefore to provide appropriate ‘keys’ and ways for private entrepreneurs to 
grasp the advantages of contract farming (profitability of contract farming against large-scale 
farming being poorly documented) and to provide them with technical and institutional 
support.  
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